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Abstract
The liberal paradox arose from the attempt to introduce individual human rights into the theory of social
choice. Being one of the major social institutions of a liberal democracy, such rights clearly belong in any
complete social choice theory. Thus Sen in his pathbreaking study argued that a person's right consisted in a
pair of social states (x, y) such that if the person preferred x to y or y to x so did society. Sen's condition L
(liberalism) then required that for each person in society there exist such a pair of social states. Two other
conditions proposed by Sen were condition U (universal domain: every profile of individual preference
orderings is possible) and condition P (Pareto principle: if everyone in society prefers x to y, so does society).
A social choice function f chooses from a set of social opportunities S according to the rule
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1. The Problem of the Liberal Paradox
The liberal paradox arose from the attempt to introduce individual human
rights into the theory of social choice. Being one of the major social
institutions of a liberal democracy, such rights clearly belong in any complete
social choice theory. Thus Sen^ in his pa'thbreaking study argued that a person's
right consisted in a pair of social states (x, y) such that if the person
preferred x to y or y to x so did society. Sen's condition L (liberalism) then
required that for each person in society there exist such a pair of social
states. Two other conditions proposed by Sen were condition U (universal
domain: every profile of individual preference orderings is possible) and
condition P (Pareto principle: if everyone in society prefers x to y, so does
society). A social choice function f chooses from a set of social opportunities
S according to the rule
(1) f(S) = |x in S: for all y in S, -^yPx],
where P is the social preference relation. f(S) is required to be nonempty.
The liberal paradox followed immediately from the following theorem due to
Sen: There is ho social choice function satisfying conditions (U) (L) and
(P). The result is paradoxical, in that conditions (U) and (P) are seemingly
innocuous, while condition (L) surely says something about individual rights.
An example here will illustrate the crucial difficulty. Consider a
society with two agents choosing among three alternatives, x, y, and 2. To
individual 1 is assigned the pair (x, y) and individual I's preferences are
2
xyz. To individual 2 is assigned the pair (x, z) and individual 2's
preferences are yzx. Then xpy via (L), zPx via (L) and yPz via (P) and there
is no social choice, every social state being inferior to some other. Among
the many resolutions to this paradox proposed in the literature, that of
2
Gibbard is in some ways the most appealing. Gibbard proposes to break the
cycle in the above example by the following weakening of condition L. Suppose
(x, y) belongs to individual i who prefers x to y. Then society prefers x to
y also, unless individual i waives his right. This occurs only if there exists
a sequence from x to some other social state 2, along which either someone
else claims his rights or there is a Pareto move, and for individual i y is
4
at least as good as 2. This condition we shall refer to as (L"). In the
above example, individual I's right to x over y is waived, since individual
2 claims his right to z over x and individual 1 prefers y to 2. On the other
hand, individual 2's right to z over x is not waived, but z is Pareto inferior
to y. Thus, Gibbard's social choice function resolves the impasse by choosing
y. Indeed, Gibbard is able to show that if there are enough social states
to go around,^ then there is a social choice function satisfying conditions
(U) (P) and (L").
Gibbard's contribution has evoked considerable response. Sen, in his
extensive survey, raises the moral issue concerning the waivure of individual
rights:
The fundamental issue really is whether individual preference
orderings alone provide enough of a basis for a social judgement
without going into the causation of and the motivation behind these
preferences. While there undoubtedly do exist cases where the
optimal solution may involve waiving a person's libertarian rights...
there also exist cases where the optimal solution involves waiving
the Pareto principle,.. To axe invariably personal rights over
assigned pairs and never the Pareto principle, when they conflict,
as Gibbard's system does, seems to me to be hard to justify.^
In another critical paper, Kelly^ argues that Gibbard's social choice function
leads to correctable miscalculation on the part of individuals. Thus, Gibbard's
waivure mechanism assumes that individuals automatically claim their rights,
when in fact this is a strategic variable open to each individual and agents
may do better otherwise. Kelly's results strongly suggest that in games
based on Gibbard's social choice function Pareto failures are likely--although
8
Kelly left this matter open.
In this paper we attempt to join strands of both lines of criticism in
one model. That is, we assume that the social choice function is the outcome
function for a certain game of strategy. The players, the individuals of
society, have as their .strategic variable their announced (as opposed to their
actual) preferences. We show that, depending on i'nformation possibilities,
Pareto inferior outcomes may result when the game is played. In this way we
not only clarify the question of the relationship between the liberal paradox
g
and game theory as raised by Aldrich, but we see that even alienable indi
vidual rights are ultimately inconsistent with the Pareto principle.
2. Model and Assumptions
In all that follows, we shall assume that there are three social states
and two individuals. Although this is admittedly a restrictive assumption,
it does have the status of an acknowledged paradigm case in social choice
theory, and it turns out that all of the interesting problems arise even at
this level of generality.
Let S = |x, y, zj be the fixed set of available social states; N = |l, 2j
the fixed set of players. To player 1 is assigned the pair (x, y); to player
2, the pair (x, z). These assignments are also fixed. Each player i has a
complete, reflexive, transitive ordering belonging to R(S), the set of all
such orderings of S, The liberal social choice function f is a map from
I4
C
S x R(S) X l?(S) to 2 ~ d) satisfying (L), where yPx if and only if some
individual has a right to y over x and his right is not waived, or for
all i and yP.x for some i.^*^ The outcomes under f are computed in table 1.
L L
Note in particular that f is multiple-valued in 33/169 cases.
Table 1 has another interpretation, namely as the matrix for the 2-person
game in strategic form. In this interpretation, player 1 has the row strategies;
player 2, the column strategies. That is, regardless of what a player's actual
preference ordering--hereafter denoted R^*--is, he can announce any ordering
he chooses to the social choice function. In particular, waiving a right can
take the form of consciously misrepresenting one preference. Thus, a person
assigned the pair (x, y) can always waive his right by announcing indifference
between them. Of course, rights claimed can also be waived by f via the
L
waivure mechanism.
To complete the description of the game, the outcomes of various strategies
must be comparable. Here a complication arises. Since the outcomes need not
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be singletons, • the ordering of S alone does not suffice to compare them. To
overcome this difficulty, the following set relations are introduced,
Definition. Let A, B be nonempty subsets of S. Then A B if and only if
xR^i>'fy for all x in A, and all y in B. Further, A B if and only if A B
and there exists an x in A and a y in B such that xP^*y,
When A and B are singletons, the relations and reduce to the relations
and respectively. The relations and need not be coiq)lete; but
for all the cases of Table 1, thus for all the comparisons which we shall be
required to make, these relations do permit comparison. The question here
arises, why go to a set relation at all? Suppose that in the background there
is some random mechanism for deciding among multiple choices. Why not simply
use expected value to compare sets of possible outcomes? The reason we needn't
12do this is the following result. Suppose U is a von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function and P(x|') is a conditional probability distribution defined
on a subset of S. Then A K. B if and only if
2 U(x)P (x|A) s 2 U(x)P„(xIb)
xeA i xsB ^
for all conditional probability distributions P^ and P^. Thus, the chosen
framework is consistent with expected utility maximization, regardless of the
exact nature of the random mechanism.
The orderings and are used to establish a relation between strategies
Thus, suppose ,R^ and R '^ are two strategies open to individual i. Then R,
dominates ' if and only if
f (S, R R ) K. f (S, R.', R.) for all R.
3.J1.L ij j
and
f-r (S, R., R.) K f^ (S, R.', R.) for some R..
A strategy is admissible for i if it is not dominated by any other strategy.
Admissible strategies play an important role in the analysis to follow. A
strategy R '^ is maximln for i if
min f,(S, R.', R.) K. min f^(S, R., R.) for all R..R^ L 1 j 1 L L j 1
13The strategy R^ = R^* we shall call sincerity. Sincerity need be neither
admissible nor maximin, as we shall see shortly. A game is straightforward
for player i if he has a unique admissible strategy; a game is essentially
straightforward for player i if all admissible strategies lead to equivalent
vectors of outcomes. In table 2 are listed the admissible strategies for
player 1 (in table 3 for player 2) as a^function of actual preference. Note
that for each player, in five cases of actual preference the game is straight
forward. In addition, in four cases for player 1 (five for player 2) the
game is essentially straightforward. Finally, for each player there are four
cases in which sincerity is inadmissible.
Table 2. Admissible Strategies, Player 1
Actual Preference Admissible•Strategies, Admissible Maximin Strategies,
Ordering Player 1 Player 1
xyz xyz, yxz yxz
xzy xzy xzy
zxy zxy, zyx zxy
zyx zyx, zxy zyx
yzx
b
yxz yxz
yxz yxz yxz
x(yz) xyz. x(yz),
a
xzy xyz, x(yz), xzy
y(xz)
b
yxz yxz
z(xy) zxy,
b
zyx zxy. zyx
(xy)z
b
yxz yxz
(xz)y xzy. (xz)y,
a
zxy xzy, (xz)y, zxy
(yz)x zyx. (yz)x. yzx, y(zx)^ zyx. (yz)x, yzx.
(xyz) R(S)^ R(S)
a = essentially straightforward
b = sincerity inadmissible
Table 3. Admissible Strategies, Player 2
Actual Preference Admissible'Strategies, Admissible Maximin Strategies,
,Ordering Flayer 2 Player 2
xyz xyz, x(yz)^ xyz, x(yz)
xzy xzyj zxy zxy
ZKy zxy zxy
b
zyx zxy zxy
yzx yzx, y(xz), yxz yzx
I
yxz yxz yxz
x(yz) xyz, x(yz), xzy^ xyz, x(yz) , xzy
,y(xz) yxz, yzx^ yxz, yzx
z(xy) zxy^ zxy
(xy)z ykz, (yx)z, yzx, y(zx)^ yxz, (yx)z, yzx, y(zx)
(xz)y zxy^ zxy
(yz)x yzx, (yz)x, zyx^ yzx, (yz)x, zyx
(xyz) R(S) R(S)
a = essentially straightforward
b = sincerity inadmissible
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3. Liberal Games
A liberal game is a quadruple (N, S, h, f ) consisting of the set of
Jpj
agents, the set of social states, the assignment mapping h from S x S to N,
and the liberal social choice function. We shall analyze the specific
liberal game (jl, 2}; jx, y, z]; (x, y) -> 1; (x, z) 2; from three
standpoints, depending on the information possibilities. First, we shall
assume that each player knows the other player's actual preferences and that
communication is allowed prior to play. This leads to a cooperative game.
Next, we shall rule out communication prior to play—a rioncooperative game.
Finally, we shall assume that neither player knows the other player's actual
preferences. In this case, one has an incomplete information noncooperative
game. Even in this case, both players know all the information of table 1,
so that the only incompleteness of information is in the knowledge of
preference.
We begin our analysis of the cooperative game by transforming it from
strategic form into characteristic function form. For each player, we ask
what outcome he can guarantee himself regardless of the other player's choice
of strategy. This is the worst outcome under his admissible maximin strategies
(tables 2 and 3, last column). Outcomes worse than these would be unacceptable
for any rational player. An outcome is acceptable to the group if there is no
other outcome which makes both players better off. Outcomes which are accept
able both to the players individually and to the group comprise the negotiation
set.
Let us call the outcome when both players use their sincere strategy the
sincere outcome of f .
L
Proposition 1. The sincere outcome need not be in the negotiation set.
11
Proof. Consider the situation (R^*, R2*) = (xyz, zxy). The sincere outcome
is z; which is unacceptable for player 1 who can guarantee himself of the
outcome jy, z] by use of strategy yxz, and jy, zj 1^1 • . same token,
player 2 can guarantee himself of the outcome jy, z\. The only outcomes in
the negotiation set therefore are |x] and |x, z].
This is a rather serious drawback to the use of the sincere outcome as
an arbitration point in bilateral negotiations, and assures that sincere out
comes will soiiietimes riot be observed in fully informed situations. Indeed,
the sincere outcome in general will fail to be a von Neumann-Morgenstern
imputation.
Now we suppose that the game is nohcoOperatlve, although each player
still knows the other player's true preferences. In this situation strategies
cannot be coordinated in advance. To this situation we adopt the hypothesis
of sophisticated revelation,Since players know each other*s preferences,
they also know each other's admissible strategies. Each player restricts
himself to admissible strategies and supposes that the- other player does
likewise. Then each player revises his set of admissible strategies. When
there is no more revising, each player is down to his ultimately admissible
set of strategies, and the outcomes corresponding to these are called the
sophisticated outcomes. A sophisticated outcome corresponds to a pure- -
strategy Nash equilibrium, although a Nash equilibrium need not lead to a
sophisticated outcome. Now we can state the following:
Proposition 2. For every profile of preferences, the liberal game has a
sophisticated outcome.
Thus, the liberal game belongs to the wider class of social choice mechanisms
possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria. In table 4, the sophisticated
12
V
outcomes (in this case, unique) are given for the cases where both players
have linear orderings (no ties) of the social states. The agreement between
sophisticated and sincere outcomes is quite good, there being only three
cases of dlsagr_eement. The most glaring of these is the cyclic case (Rj^*, 1^2*^
(zxy, xzy). After.reducing to admissible strategies, the game matrix is
zxy
zyx
xzy zxy
Sincerity is now inadmissible for player 1, since strategy zyx dominates zxy.
The sophisticated outcome is z, corresponding either to the strategies
(zyx, xzy) or (zyx, zxy), whereas the sincere outcome is x. Notice that the
two other cases of disagreement are also those in which the sincere outcome
is not in the negotiation' set. In the first of these, (R^*, ^2*^ ~ zxy)
This situation is straightforward for. player 2, the game matrix being
xyz
yxz
zxy
yj 2
Thus for player 1, yxz dominates xyz, since }y, z\ {z|. Indeed, if an even
chance lottery over x and z is held and players have von Neumann-Morgenstern
utilities, this outcome is Pareto inferior to |x, z\. The other case of dis
agreement is similar to this one.
It is interesting that the cyclic case motivating Gibbard's analysis'
has sophisticated outcome = sincere outcome, each player ultimately using
his sincere strategy. The reduction to admissibility yields the matrix
. 15
13
Table 4. Sophisticated Outcomes
Player 1
Player 2
xyz xzy zxy zyx yzx • yxz
xyz X X y> 2| y, z
a
y X
xzy K X z z z X
zxy K
b
z z z X
zy± y z z z z y
yzx y z y, z! iyj z y. y
yxz y iy. 2! y, z y, z y y
a = cyclic case
b =s outcome different from sincere
yxz
14
yzx y(xz) yxz
xyz y X X
y y y
Sincerity now dominates for player 1, and so sincerity ultimately dominates
for player 2 as well. But this state of affairs is rather exceptional. For
instance when actual preferences are (xyz, zyx), the sophisticated outcome
(also sincere) {y, z\, but both players are lying about preferences. The
situation is straightforward for player 2, his only admissible strategy
being zxy; this leads player 1 to adopt yxz over xyz.
xyz
yxz
2
1\ zxy
y> z
Asocial choice function is manipulable^^ if by a change of strategy an
individual player can change an outcome in his favor. The above examples
make it possible to assert the following:
Proposition 3. The liberal social choice function is manipulable.
Nor should this come as a surprise when sincerity is an inadmissible strategy.
Summarizing the results of the noncooperative game, individuals aware of
their strategic possibilities often reach the sincere outcome, but some
tension with the Pareto principle seems ready to appear.
In the case where neither player knows the other's preferences, the
Pareto tension becomes quite explicit. Now each player faces a decision
under uncertainty, probabilities not being available on what the other
15
player's preferences are. One attitude that remains reasonable is to adopt
only admissible strategies. As we have already seen, sincerity need not be
admissible for either player. A competing criterion is the maximin criterion:
only strategies are considered Which maximize the worst outcome. In fact,
suppose that each player adopts both attitudes, and uses only maximin strategies
which are admissible.
Proposition 4. In the incomplete information noncooperative liberal game,
suppose that each player's actual preferences are a linear ordering and that
each player uses only admissible maxitnin strategies. Then Pareto inferior
outcomes are certain to occur, and insincere outcomes occur more frequently
than in the case of complete information.
Table 5 is the companion to table 4 for the incomplete information
context. Note that in five cases, the outcome now differs from the sophis
ticated outcome and that three of these result in Pareto inferior outcomes.
These Pareto failures are easily explained by the fact that for player 1
with preferences xyz and for player 2 with preferences xzy, sincerity is
not a maximin strategy. Now for many social choice functions, even Borda's
rule, sincerity is not only admissible but maximin; unfortunately the
liberal social choice function is not one of them.
Among the other outcomes there are fewer surprises. For Gibbard's
example (xyz, yzx), the outcome is again y, via the announced preferences
(yxz, yzx). Of the two cases of results different from the complete
infomatioh case, one makes player 1 better off at 2's expense, while the
other makes 2 better off at 1's expense. Thus, whether having one's
preferences known by an opponent will make one better off seems a contingent
16
Table 5. Outcomes Under Admissible Maximin Strategies
\ xyz xzy zxy zyx yzx yxz
xyz
a
y iy>z ^ ly, 2 y, z! y y
xzy X
a
z z z z X
zxy X z z z z X
zyx y z z z iy» z y
yzx y y, z] !y. z! y» z] y y
yxz y ly. zj iy> z iy. 2} y y
a = Pareto inferior outcome
17
matter, although in a majority of cases the presumption is in favor of having
known preferences.
At this point two further incomplete information games could be con
sidered. In the first, one might adopt a Bayesian framework with expected
utility maximization and subjective probability; however, there is still a
positive probability that a Pareto inferior outcome will occur. A second
model, more in the spirit of temporary equilibrium, has agents announce
strategies sequentially, revising their expectations about each other's
true preferences at each stage. Under certain assunqjtions about expecta
tions, for instance that each agent expects the other to announce only
admissible strategies, the agents can eventually learn each other's prefer
ences and thus reach the sophisticated outcome or the negotiation set.
But without such learning, this model need hardly be Pareto-satisfactory.
4. Conclusion
This paper has considered the properties of the 2-person, 3-state
liberal game. The paradigm case discussed by Gibbard turns out very well:
the sincere outcome is the negotiation set in the cooperative game, it
corresponds to a Nash equilibrium in the noncooperative game, and it is
the unique solution to the incomplete information gaine when players adopt
only maximin admissible strategies. However, none of this need occur in
general. If individuals are given rights and are expected to use them
wisely, they have to know each other's preferences; otherwise, Pareto
inferior outcomes are bound to occur. In this sense, -the Liberal Paradox
will always be with us.
18
Footnotes
1. See A. K. Sen, Collective Choice and Social Welfare, pp. 78-88.
2. Throughout this study, the preference ordering xPy, yPz, xPz will be
written Kyz. Ties will be denoted by parentheses; thus xPy, ylz, xPz
is written x(yz).
3. See A. Gibbard, "A Pareto-Consistent Libertarian Claim."
4. Ibid., p. 401,
5. Ibid., for a precise statement.
6. Sen, "Liberty, Unanimity, and Rights," contains an extensive discussion
of Gibbard's function.
7. This is just one of the criticisms J. Kelly, "Rights Exercising and a
Pareto-Consistant Libertarian Claim," makes, although it is the major one,
8. Ibid., p. 141.
9. See Aldrich, as well as the exchange between Aldrich and Miller which
follows. Our results here suggest that the connection between the
Liberal Paradox and game theory is not nearly as direct as Aldrich
implies, thus coming down more on the side of Miller.
10. Note that this is a slight strengthening of Gibbard's function, to
satisfy the strong Pareto condition. This strengthening has been made
in the interest of decisiveness, and does not materially affect the
results.
11. J. S. Kelly, "Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions Without
Singlevaludness," is the source for these relations.
12. R, Gardenfors is the source of this result.
13. R. Farquharson is the source for this idea, and also for the idea of
straightforwardness. Essential-straightforwardness is the same idea
as Hurwicz's essential-singlevaluedness.
14. See Farquharson, chapter 8, for further discussion.
15. Gibbard,op. cit., pp. 398-99. Let 1 = Edwin, 2 = Angelina, x = w^,
y = w„, z = w_ to see that these are indeed the same case.
£• J
16. For instance, see A. Gibbard, "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A
General Result."
19
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